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IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH
CLEARFIELD STATE BANK,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

ve.

PETERS PLPMBIXG &:. HEATING COI\lP ANY,
SALT LAKE AC'l'O ACCTIOX T:'JC., AND
E\m~\f:t\TTY
!XSURAXCE OOMPANY OF
KOHTH A}fERlCA,
De.fendants and Respondent.o.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.

SECTION 45-1-65, U'I_'AH COJH; AKXO'J'AT.tm 1903,
DOES 1\0T RELIEVE SALT LAKE AUTO AL"CTIOK IXC. FROM THI<} Rr;SPONSTBTLlTY A.'D
DUTY '1'0 DELlVEH CERTIFICATE OF TITLE.
Plaintiff'o; complaint alleges that Salt Lake Auto
Auction sold the 1958 Chevrolet automobile to George
B. \Vest knowing that said George B. \Vest purchased
said automobile for the purpose of selling the same and
that said George R. West did sell said automobile (Complaint, paragraphs 5 and 6 of Second Claim for Relief).
ThE' respondents' brief overlooks or avoido; the fact that
the complaint alleges that the Rank purchased the conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ditional sales contract eov1or·ing the :";tth• of the Chevrolet
automobile from George B. \Vest and paid utbw for
the conditional sales contract in respondent~' discussion
of estoppel.
The provisions of SE'dion 41-1-65 do 110t relieve the
wholesaler from the duty of tramferring title to the
retailer where the automoloilP sales transaction i., one
between dealers. The provisiom of 41-1-65 merely relieve
the selling dealer rrom obtaining a transfer of ncgistration of such ..-ehicle when the sale i.~ to another dealer,
hut specifically n·quires a transfer of the then existing
title.
"41-1-63. TRAN.S"F'ER '1'0 nEALER when
tl1c transferee of a vehiele is a deal1'r wbo lwlds
the same for n'~ail' . . . . Tl1P. transferee shall
not be required to obtain tran~l'Pr of registration
of such vehielc or forward the certificates of title
and registration to the department, but ~wh
trnu->fcrcc upon lransfcrring liis title or in.'N-eM
to an."other J!<':rSOfl shall cxcc;de and ar·k111mledge
an a8~,;.(f!lmfnt and tcarranl.i! of tii!,-· upon the
cerlifiwlr of title und d,-fil"l'r ilu' .':1.'11/f lliid their
certi.fiu;te o.f rcgicdrafion lo /fir pcrsof!. to whom
,•!](ch llonsfet· is made." (ltalics supplied)

The failure to deliwi" Uw t.ilte certificate of t.he
nntornobile in que~tion to the tra.nsfel"(•r WeHt or to the
pu1·cha~er from West eoMtitntPs a violation of the act
and the condition of the bond
Section ..J.l-:l-23(D), "Ctah Code AnnotatPd 1953, provide~

as follow,;:

"PROHIBITED AC'l'~ OR OMISSIOKSVIOL.\.'riOX BY LICENSEE. - 1t shall be un2
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lawful and a violation of this act for the holder
of any license i><~IIE'd under the terms and provisiom hereof: . . . (D) To violate any law of
the statl' of Utah now existing or hereafter enacted respecting commcrC'e in motor vehicleR or
any lawful rule or regulation respecting commerce in motor vehicle:-> pr·ornulgated by any licensing or regulating authority now existing or
hereaFter created hy the laws of the ~tate of
Utah."
Section 41-3-18 giv1.·~ a right of action agaimt the
licen~e dealer and the fmret;; upon the dealers bond for
"violation of any of the provisions of tl1is act ... " Thus,
the failure of Salt TJake Anto Auction to deliver title
to the automobile in question to George B. "\Vest or to
tlw persons to whom he has sold the automohile or sold
the title thereto is a violation of the act and gives the
plaintiff a right of action against Salt Lake Auto Auction Inc. and it~ bondsmen, Indemnitv Tn:mranc-c Coniparry of North America, for damages.
POI.:\'!' II.

PIJAINTIFF BANK IS XOT CIL\RO!i~D VliTH
KNOVVLEDGJ-; OF TT'l'LE IN AXYOXE O'f'Hl<JR
'rHAN GEOHG.J<..; B. WLST.
The respondents in their brief refening to the
plaintiff a~ "the Bank" at page 13, state:
"The Bank knowo<, or certainly should knuw,
that in order for a dealer to have m:y right to
sell a motor vehicle he mu;;t have ir1 his possession the title document~ thereto, .... "
There is nothing in the record to indicate that the
plaintiff Bank knew or should have known that the' dealer

3
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G-eorge R. West had ItO right to seli the Clw~Tolet automobile. On the contrary, the record slwws "that at th!O!
time the po~se~~ion of said motor \·chicle was delivered
to the mid George B. Wesl ... Salt Lake Auto Auction
knew that ·west intended to offer said motor vehicle
for sale." 'l'hat under such circumstances Salt Lake
Auto Auction i~ estopped, has been discussed in appellants brief filed herein.
The mere fact that the plaintil'f is a bank and knows
of a custom of flooring· cars or of delivering· cars and
holding ti11c eertil"icatc doe~ not charge it with actual
or implied knowledge that such was the fact in this
particular instance. In !.he ( a~l· of l'ommereial Credit
Company\·~. llarn,~y -:\[otor Company, (CaL) lfi P. 2nd
1181, and cases cited therein, it was held !hat mere knowledge of the general pradir·f' of flooring cars was not
~ul'ficient to pla,·c on inquiry a bank which parted with
value in _purcha~ing a title retaining conditional ~uk~
contract without actual notice or kno·wledge of the facts
to vut the bank on inquir·y of the title of a title holder
who lrad entru~tcd the motor vehicle to a dealer under a
tr·ust. receipt.

POIXT III.
THI<; PROVISIO"i'JS OF SFX''riOX 41-3-3, rT AH
CODE AXNOTATED 1953, DO XOT B.Alt SUIT
AGAl}.'ST SALT LAK.I<; ~i.l.-'1'0 ..:\.CC'I'IOX, lKC., OR
lTS RO)i)DS!IlEX, IXDE:JE"lTY lXSURAXCE C0:'\1P.ANY OF NORTH Al\I.ffiRll'~\..
Plaintiff'.~

nd.ion against Salt Lake ~\.uto Auction
rs for damage11 and/or to qnid title to til(' automihle in
•t•rP:;tion. Sedion 41-3-:l, Utah Code Annotated, merely
4
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provides that there shall be no right of action for recovef)- of a motor vehicle or any part of the selling
price thereof by a dealer or his successors or assigns, in
an.v case where the vendor dealer ::thall have failed to
comply with the terms and conditions of the act. Plaintiff is not sueing Salt Lake Auto Auction for· the possession of the autimobile nor are they sueing them for
the purchase price as there i~ no contract or purchase
between Salt Lake Auto Auction and plaintiff. Plaintiff
seeks to quiet title to the automobile and for its damages
as against Salt Lake Auto Auction.

POINT IV.
SECTION 41-4-3, UTAII CODE ANNOTA'l'ED 1953,
IS CON'l'RARY 'rG THE CONSTITUTIONS Oli' 'l"HtJ
STATE OF CTAH AND OJ<' 'l"H.Ii; "CXITED STATES
OF A}fEHICA, IS CNCOXSTITUTIOXAL AND
'i'OID.

Section 41-3-2, Utah Code Annotated 19.13,
as follows:

provide~

"CERTIFICAT.l<J OP 'I'ITLE 'j"\J vr;NDEE
-b'vcry person, firm, or corporalin11 upon tlw
sale and delivery of any used or SC'eond hand
motor vehicle shall within forty-eight hours thereof deliver to the vendee, and endor::ted accordingto law, a certificate of title, issued for ,;aid vehiclP
by the ~tate tax eormnission.''
Section 41-3-3, l~tah Code AnMtated 190::!, provides as follows:

"PEXALTIES li'OH YTOLATIOX 0.1<' AC1'
-No action or right of ariion to recover any su,,h
motor vehicle, or any part of the selling. pri(-e
5
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thereof, sl1all be maintained in the courts of thi~
state by any ~ueh dealer or vendor, his -~urreo"
sor~ or assigns, in any case wherein such vendor
or dealer shall have failed to comply with the
terms and provisions of this act, and such vendor
or dealer, upon conviction for the violation of
any of the provisions of thi~ act shall be deenwd
guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be puni~hed Ly
a fine of not more than $299 or b;v~ impri~oument
for not more than six months in the county iail
.
'
or by both ,;uch fine and imprisonmPnt."

.

Section 41-3-3 effects an arbitrary tran~for of the
property M one private P''rson (Clearfield State Dank)
to another private person (Pe1et~ Plumbing & Heating
Company). bul'l1 ~tatute i~ so arbitrary anrl unreasonable as to be repugnant to the duP proccs~ daru;e ol' both
the Consti!uli(JJJ of the l~nited States and the Constitution of the State of rtah, and in addition, .;llch statute
discriminate~ against automobilP sellPr~ and automobile
sales tran.;aetion~.
The provi~ions of Sed.ion 41-3-2 fixes a forty-eight
hour time limit for delivery to the vendee of a ('J'rtil'i(·atf'
of title i.s:"'tl('d for !he automobile purchased by the State
'l.'a" Commission of Utah. By reason of the failure of
the wndor, <Jeorge B. 'Vest. to issue title within fortyeight hours, the J'i·~pondent~, the \\"hOlP~akr, thl' wholesaler's bondsman, and the vendee, claim that no action
c.an be brought ag·ain~1 any of !hem for an~· reason or
for ttll.\" mnount bec.au~c of tlll' provisions of 41-3-3.
Set·lion 41-3-3 in di'Pd li>rf"1•its to the n•ndee tho
propert;.c oft]](' vendor or of persons to whom the vendor
may ltave n::-:signed or ~old a prO]ll.'l't~· i.ntcn:::-:1 in an
automobilt• for the failure to deliver a certificate of title.
6
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The due proceo;~ provisions of the Constitution of the
United States and of the State of Utah prolJibit both
i4tatr and Federal legislation that effects an uncompensated transfer of one person'8 property to another
private person.
"There is no rule or prindple lmown to onr
system under which private property can be taken
from one person and tran8fcn·ed lo another for
the private uo;e and benefit of .surh other person,
whether by general law or special Pnactment."
Cooley on Constitutional Limit;ltions, 7lh Ed.,
:JI:G-308, Slirl0 vs. Rohmeyer (Wi~.), 260 :\.\V.
647.
"\Vhile the amount of a p<malty i~ within the
control of a legislature in tl1e r'\f'f"{·i,·" of its police
power, this power is suhieet to the limitdi011
that the amount must not be so gro~sly excc.~~in•
af'l to comtitute a deprivation of property "\\ithout
due proces~ of Jaw and accordingly the imposition of a pPnalt.v in a named o:um a~ liqnidatc•d
damages may he so greatly out of proporUon to
the poso;ible actual damage- and "o arbitrary a:1d
oppres~ive as to comtitutc a Yidati011 of tlie
constitutional provisions." 16A C ..J.S. 001-Sn"2,
Constitutional Law, Seetion 64-0.
In the case of _}fi.ssouri Paeitie Railroad Company
WI. Tucker, L~. S. Supreme Court, 2:-m L S. 340, 51 h ~Jd.
1507, the state of' Kansas had enacted a statutP prescribing rate~ for !.he intrasl.a!{' ~}1ipment of oil, eh'.,
and prescribing a penalty of $500 anrl reasonable attorney's fees for exacting, demanding or receiYing any
sum in excess of the prescribed rate.
The plaintiffrespondent had made a shipment of 25 barreb and was
charged $3.0~ in excess of the prescribed legislative rate
7
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and brought the aelion for his $500 penalty and reasonable attorney',; fees under the ~latute. The railroad
company defended upon the ground" that the statutory
ratrs were confi~catory and void and that the statute
and particularly the provision for the recovery of $500
as liquidated damages was ~o arbitrary and unreasonable as to be requgnant to the due process of law and
<>qui }lro1edi0ll clause of the 14th Amendmnt to the
Constitution of the United States .
.lnstice Van Devanter in delivering the op1mon of
the U. S. Supreme Court states:
'·It will be pCrZ'ci'.·r·] that this liability is not
proportioned to the actual damages. It i~ not
as if double or treble d:lJtt~l.c;l'" wpJ·e allowed, a3
often i::; done, a11d as WE' think properly could hav1•
been done lwrP. Xor is it as if thPre would be
difficull_1 in proving or ascertaining the actual
damage~. thereby furnishing a reason for prescribing a liquidated amount reasonably approximating the probable damages, takinp: one case
"-ith another . . . '\Vha1 the statutE' does i~ to
authori:-.c a recovery of $300 in every ('a~l',
whetlF•r the ,.;hipment be of 1 barrel or of lO or
:!J bar.-pls, or of a tank car; and this altl1ough
it is of common knowledge that t1u' po,.;Rible daraag-(',.; in respect of tlw <'llal·gp for ,-arr:ing uny
of tltf'~e from one point in Hw state to anotlwr
could neYer be more than a small fraction of that
~urn."

"As applied to en~p;:. likE' tlw present, the bpositioll of $300 a::>liquidaiPd damag'f'fl is not only
gro~sly out of proportion to the po,sible actual
dtunage~, but i~ ~o arbitrary and oppressi\·e that
ils enfot·ccment would he nothing short of the
8
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taking of property without due process of law,
and therefore in contravention of the 14th Amendmen ... "

'

fn the ~asl' of Stierle et al vs. Rolnneyer et al, (Wis.)
260 N."\V. 64i, the constitutionality of a statute canceling
and deeming a mortgage indebtedness satisfied for the
failure of mortgagee to comply with the o;tatute relating
to foredo~ure ·was considered. The plaintiff had loaned
money jo defendant and taken a real estate mortgage
and chattel mortgage securing a loan of $5500.00. Prior
to the time of the suit plaintiff-mortgagee had taken
possession of ~orne of the property covered by the chattel
mortgage and sold the same. In so doing mortgagee
had failed to comply with the requirements of the statute
relating to the foreclo~>urc in that he failed to give noti<"e
of the sale and failed to make a return of the sule as re(tuired by ihe statute. Mortgagee brought suit for foreclosure ol' the mortgaged debt of $4500 and mortgagee df'fended claiming the debt canceled by virtue of non-compliance with tJre statute by mortgagee and for damages
plus $25.00. The triul court applied the statute, found
that the rnor·tgagor had been damag·cd in the sum of
$138 by the unlawful sule and awarded him a 825 penalty
for non-complianC'e \\·ith the statute and entered _judgment canceling the mortgages of record and dismissing
the mortgagee's complaint r·or the deficiency due on the
indebtedness and awarded the defendant mortgagor $163
damages. The Wisconsin Supreme C'ourt held that the
portion of the statute providing that "the debt secured
by such mortgage shull be deemed fully mti ~fied and
the mortgage canceled" was unconstitutional as a -...--iolation of the due process clause of the 14th Amendment
9
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to the Con8titution of the Cnited States on the ground
that it was arbitrary and unreasonable. The Court in
its opinion ;;tates as follows:
"The taking by a state of the privaie property of one person or corporation, without the
owner',; consent, for the pri-.,-ate use of anotlwr.
i~ not due proec~s of law, and i~ a violation of
the J'ourtccnth article of Amendment of the Con><titution of the rnited States."
"It i~ tmder this eon<'ept of dne rn·or·('~~ that
state courts have helrl that propE"rly rights cannot
be taken from one person and transferred to
another by legislative action, in whatever form
those rights may be. Gilman v. 'l'ncker, 128 1\'.Y.
190, ~il X.E. 1040, 13 L. R .A.. 304, :w Am. Rep.
464; Xew g.ngland Trout & Salmon Club Y.
Mather, 68 Vt. :J38. 35 A. 3~~~. 33 T,. R A. 369;
Dennis v. J.{oses, 18 "\Va~l1. ;J37, ;)2 P. 333, 40 L.
K .A.. 302; Roekwcll v. Nearing, 35 N. Y. :JU:.!;
'l'aylor v. Portr:-r, .t llill (X. Y.) 140, HI, .j.(\ Am.
Dec. :.!74; Williamfi v. Village of Port Chester, 72
App. Div. 50:1, 76 S. Y. S. 631, 635; Kinney v.
Beve!"l0y, 2 Hen. & },L (U Va.) 318, 336; Quimby
v. Hazen, 3± Vt. 132, HO; ~tate ex rel Ch.apuw.ll
v. Medical Borad, .'"1-1- .Minn. 387, 20 X.W. 123;
.Meffert v. State Board, 66 Kan. 710, <2 P. 2±7,
1 L. R. A. (N.S.) 811; Brown Y. Boat·d of Levee
Com'rs, 50 \Ii><~. 4G8, 4<9."
''The

~upremr.

Court of the l"nited States
ha~ expre~~l~· held that a 6tatute whirl1 b~· its
terms e:o:~\('h penaltie~ beyond the hounds of
reason is un,·onstitutional. SoutJnvestern T. & 'f.
Co. v. Danaher, 238 L. S. 41:'2, ::;.", S. Ct. S::l,J, 8tl~.
59 L. .HJd. l+Jfl, L. K A. 191(i,\, !::US; },fi~somi
Pacific R Co. v. 'l'ucker, 230 FS. ::i-10, ;;3 i~. Ct.
961, fl63, 07 L. Ed. 1507; Kansas C'ity S. R. Co.

10
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v ..Anderson, 233, C. A. :125, 34 S. Ct. 599, JS J.J.
Ed. 983; Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 12il, 28 S.
Ct. 441, 52 L . .~<;d. 741., 13 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 93~,
14 Ann. Cas. 764; \Villeox v. Consolidated Gas
Co., 212 C. S. 19, 29 S. Ct. 192, 53 L. 1-Jd. BR2,
48 L. R. A. (~. S.) 1134, 15 Ann. Cas. 1034. 'l'o
the same point are Ex pa rtf' \Vood (C. C.) 153
P. 190; Beckler Prod. Co. Y. American Express
Co., 15G Ark. 29G, 246 S. W. 1. 26 A. L. H. lUJ"I:
State v. Cra·wford, 74 Wash. 248, 1Cl3 P. !'i00, 4G
L. R. A. (N. S.) 1039. See note 01.1 this snl:,ir·r~
in 46 L. H. ..:\. (X.S.) in connection witl• the
report of the ca~e last cited. In all of the~e cfHWS,
it i~ held that a penalty that is unreasonable in
amount deprive,; the penalized party of his _property without due process. The penult;· here is
dearly subject to the same condemnation as those
involved in the cases cited. In the Tud{er easr.
supra, a penalty of $500 impm;ed by ~lat1lte for
charging a flhipper a freight rate in Po.<"('S:-' of a
statutory rate was held lo rrnrlcr Hw pr:malt~
provision void. 'l'lw opinion s~ates: ''It will he
preceived that this liability is not )n·oportionPd to
the actual damap:es .... A~ applied to caees like
the present, tlw impol':'ition of $500 a~ li<tuidntc"l
damage!\ i8 nol only gl'O~sl.v ont of _proportion to
the possible actual damages, but is so arhiJmrY
and appressive that its cnl'orcement would l1e
nothing short of the taking of property without
due procefls of law, and therefore in eontravt>nlion
of the 14th Amendment."
"The de~icions of th0 United Statt>fl Sn]:r'''I'W
Court that have uphelrl penaltie~ as rea~mwhlc
reC'ognize the prinrJiple that to he upheld theY
must be reasonable. Water~-Picree Oil i_'o. 1·.
Texas, 212 "C. S. 86, 29 S. Ct. 220, 53 L. Ed. HI;
Chicago & ).1. W. Ry. Co. v . .:\y(', etc., Co., 2GU
11
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l~.

S. :J5, 43 S. Ct. 55, 67 L. Ed. 115; Life &
Casualty Ins. Co. ol' 'Tenn. v. McCray, 291 r. S.
566, 54 S. Ct. 482 485, 78 L. Ed. 987. In the last
case cited, it is said that the principle applL's
'·though the increment to ihC' judgment he classified as penal, if the amount is not imrnod1.·nlte.
The measure, not the name, controls." 'I'lris
court has enunciated the principle in St.1te Y.
Redmon, 134 Wis. S!J, 114 X.W. 131, 1~8, 1-l L.
R. A. (X.S.) 229, 126 Am. St. Rep. 1003, 15 Ann.
Cas. 408, as is shown below. It ,,.a~ hehl l1Y the
New Jer~ey Court of ~\ppeal~ in Cigarm~k1;rs'
Cnion v. Goldberg, 72 J\'. ,J. Law, 21-1-, 61 A. 457,
70 L. R. A. 156, 111 Am. St. Rep. 662, that dur
process of law requires that in the infli1.•tion of
penaltiP~ hy Leg-islatun;s, the Legislature ~lioul!l
prescribe the amount of the penalty, or >'0Ll"
definite standard for fixing th0 amount, or that
the amount should be determined in a judi!•id
proceedings instituted against the offendn 'l'~w
statute }wre involw;d, after fjxing the amom1t rrf
the penalty at $25, and the damage~ to the mortgagor, goe:o on to inflict as further penaltY a forfeitute of the whole debt, whether it hr ~.).000. :ts
here, or 5 cents in another case. The latter penalty has no relation whatever either to the injlF~
inflicted upon the dchtor. to the turpitude involved in the statutory violation. or to ::.ny injur:·
to the publie. Tt. i;; nothing hut arbitrary expropriation, tl1e taking of a creditor's property regardless of the amount or value thereof. and conferring it upon the debtor. It is inflietin;:; on
one person for the omission of a statutory duty
a penalty differrnt in amount from that inflicted
on another person for violation of the same duty
under the same circumstances, and is tim~ llr:l:··JJJg· to persons ti1e equal protrdion of the bw."
12
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"Tt is contended the penalty provi:;1on ma,v
be upheld as an exercise of the police power. But
~tatutes under the police power must be reasonable. This court said in State v. Redmon, mpra:
'In general, as before shown, all police rq;ulations
must bear l.l1e judicial test of reasonahlrness
undN all the circumstm1ce~. This doctrine is
being more and more emphasized as the numbL•l'
of pOlice regulations multiply, e>incin~· n tendencv to fence in individual freedom a8 to matters
not' fonnedy so narrowed Ly lPgislative enadments.' ... Illu~tratiYe of that it i~ said in Plec;~y
v. Ferguson, 163 "C. S. 5;17, 16 >:-'. Ct. 1138, 41 L.
Ed. 256, that ev1•ry Jegi~lative exerei~e or the
police power must be reasonable, and in Rideout.
\·.Knox, 148 }.lass. 36B, Hl N. E. :l90, 2 L. R. A.
81, 12 Am. St. H.ep. 560, that rcasonahlenes~ is one
of the inherent limitations of such power.'"
"State v. Redmon, sUJil'a, also treat;; exhaustively of the police power and points out
that two things must exist to smtain a statute
enacted in the exercise of this power. After gnot.ing from Lawton v. StAPle, 152 u.s. !33, 137, 14 s_
C't.. 4-99, 38 L. ~;d, CIS.): "''To ,justif~· the state in
thus interposing its authorit:- in behalf of the
public, it must appear, first, that the interp;,ts
of the public generally, a8 distingui~lwd from
those of a partirular dass, require such interferenc.e; and, second, that the means are rrasonably nerRssa1·y for the accomplishment of thP. purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individual,:.' 1he coul't comments as follow~; 'Controlling ,;igni l'icaMI' ~hould lJe attached to tlw
words above quoted, "(.he interests of I he publi"
generally," etc., ·'require such interferencP." Xot
that some individuals now and then, or even
generally demand it, or require it. In otliL·r
13
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words, that it is rRao;onably essential or necessary to sueh interests that the subject thereof
should be dealt with by the legi~laturR.' and
o:tatc~ that enactments l.lllder the police power
must meet the test as stated by See. 14.'l, Freund,
.Police Power: "Does a dailgcr exist"/ h it n:"
sufficient magnitude'! Does.it concern the .illl;,_
lie Does the proposed measure tend to remove
iU Is the restraint or requirement in proportion
to the dangerf ls it possible to secure the object
sought without impairing essential righst and
principles!"
''It is for the court to decide 'whether it
really relates to a legitimate subject, or under the
gui~e of doing ~o \'iolate~ rights of p0rson~ or
property.' State v. R.edrnon, 134 \Vis. 89,107,114
N. VV. 137, 141, l+ L. R. A. (N. S.) :.!:28, 126 Am.
St. Rep. 1003. 13 AmL Ca~. 408. As stated in
}l ugler v. Kansar<, 123 F. S. 623, 661, 8 8. Ct. :2i3
297, 31 L. Ed. 205: "l'he courts are not bound by
mere forms, nor are they to he mio;led Ly mrre
pretensse. They are at liberty, indeed, are under
a solemn duty, to look at the substance of things,
whenever they enter upon the inquiry whether
the legislature lms trano;cended the limits of it~
authority. If, therefore, a statute purporting
to have been enacted to protect the public health,
the public morals, or the public safety, has no
real or substantial relation to those object<>, or
is a palpable invasion of the rights secured by
the fundamental la11·, it is the duty of the courts
to so ajudge, and thereby give effect to the ('AJllstitution.' "

"The penalizing provision here involvE'd does
not meet the above test. If it be said that the
pnblic interest is so involyed a<> to justify some
penalty, all reasonable requirements in that rc14
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gard are met by the $25 penalt.v and the stipulation as to recovery of all damage,; »m;tained. A
greater penalty than $25 doubtless might reasonalJly have been imposed. Penalties or double or
treble damages have been upheld. But to go thr
extent here attempted in imposing tJw penalty
under consideration is utterly unn'asonallie, 'a
palpable invasion of rights ~ecured b;t the fundamE'ntallaw' and 'unduly oppressive,' a11d it i~ onr
duty 'to so adjudge and thereby give dl"r,("j to the
constitution.' "
"'l'he penalizing provision~ or the ~tatute are
not ~nvrd hy the fact that the transfer of the
property is to be effected in tl1C ~":PiSC or a
penalty."
In Rc Deming's Guardiamhip, (Wasl1.) 73 P. 2nd
764, the court considered a statute awarding a ward a
lOS· penalty for railur·p of the guardian to render an
accounting at the time required by statute. The court
in holding the penalty unconstitutional ~tatcd:
"}[anifestly, the 10 per eent is a penalty and
and not a compensatioc1. Brown v. Kildea, :'iS
·wash. 184, 108 P. 452, 1133. Its imposition doc~
not depend upon the existencr of any da111:1.cu•
whatsoever. A penalty may hr so rx1·b~ivc as
to amount to a deprivation of proper·(:· 11-itlwut
due proces~ of la>v. Southwe~1rrn 'l'el. & Tel. Co.
v. Danaher, 238 L". 8. 482, 35 S. Ct. 8R6, 39 L. E~~1419, L. R. A. 191GA, 1108; Suprr·ior LaundrY
('o. v. Rosr, 193 Ind. 138, 137 N. ~;. 761, 13n ~:
E. 142,26 A. L. R. 1392; Stierlro v. Rohmo;;rr, :218
\Vi~. 149,260 X.\\'. 647:12 C. J. 12-Hl-1~-li, ~P{".
1031, 1032."
it stands afford~
a court an opportunity t.o pnni>'lt a guardian, who

"It is true that the hnv

a~
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may have been ~low in filing hi~ accounts, for
other derelictions of duty, but this is not an admirable theory, or one which either Legislatures
or oourts should encourage. A default by a trustee
should carry its own appropriate penalt~·, and a
statute which may permit the imposition of dcservL·d punis}unr•nt in a case i11 whid1 the law
faib to provide an adequate per•al!y i,; J•ot, for
that reason, to be upheld, if, considered in connedion \\·i!.h its clearly expressed purpose, it is
ohnoxiouJ; to certain well-organized legal principles. As we read the penalty ~tatute in the light
of the laws of Indiana and the dPcisiom of tlw
Supreme Court of that state, and in consideration
of the fact t11at in this jurisdiction there is no
statute providing a penalty to be H·~t1;d upoTJ a
guardian in case of his mi~wppropriation of his
ward's property, \n' cannot but condude that thl'
statute in que~tion makes mandatory :::o scverl'
a penalty for· whaL ~ill often amount to no more
than a trivial departure from a guardian's stututorJ- duties, resultig in no damage to his ward,
as to amount to deprivation of propert:- without
dUf~ proee~s of law."
"Careful COil~idPration of the ~tatl':r now
under discussion, in the light of tlu• authoritie,,
convinces us that the pn1vi~ion tlwreof purporting to impose a 10 per cent pcnalt_,. for failure to
rile a verifiNl account w!thin tllf' timr limited h
la\1· i~ arbitrary, unjust, and discriminatory i~
rot based upon any reasonable theor;o· of cornpensation. and that the ~ume is ron~equently
void u~ amounting to taking proywr·:_,. without
duE' pm1'PS~ of h1w. \Ve ;ceeordingly hold tha7
the portion of the law purporting to impo~e a 10
per rent penalty for failure to file a vrrified
account within the tinw limited by Ia\\" is. vod
and of no effect."
16
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Additional citations and cases may be found in the
text of the above decisions. To recite them independt>nlly in tlti~ brief would amount to supernurnerat.ion of
citations already before the Court.
The reasoning of the above decisions at·e equally applicable to the due process clame of thE' Constitution of
Otah, Article 1, Section 7, which provides "No person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property -..dthout due
proce:;~ of law."
Though the words ''J'OJ·feiture" or ·'penalty" are not
used in :Section 41-3-3, the actual effeet of 41-3-3 is to
forfeit to Peters Plumbing ami Heating Company the
automobile and property rights of the plaintifr,
Clearfield State Bank.
An ('Xttlllination of the conditional sale~ <"onfract attached to the <"omplaint indie~te;; that Peter~ Plumbing
and Heating Company agreed to purchase the 1958
Chevrolet fo1· a total prin~ of $2,0:)3.00. Peters Plumbing and Heating Company paid eash in the ~\\Ill or
$1,000.00, traded in an automobile for the agreed value
of $395.00 and agr0ed to va.v the unpaid cash ·balance
of $1,160 )Jlus insurance of $86.00, license and transfer
fees of $4.00 and the time price difereniial of $2:'i.OO,
in monthly installment~, the total eontract balanc•c being
$1,275.00 to be paid by Peters Plumbing and Heating.
For the conditional sale~ contraet the plaintiff ha;; paid
money to George B. \Ve~t and i;; out $1.275 or the Chevrolet automobile sold to Peter"6 Pluml1ing and Heating
Company. Peter,; PlLunbing and Heating Company are,
at most, out $1,000 plus the value of the trade-in at
the time ol" the transaetion. The effect of 41-3-3 as ap11
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plied in this ea;;e i5 to transfer to Peters Plumbing and
Heating Company the property of the plaintiff in the
amount of Sl,275.00 and result~ in an unjust ·enrichment
of Peters Plumbing and Heating Company.
Peters Plumhing and Hl·ating Company is not without its remedy.
It may have its damages from the
dealer, George B. We~l, upon the contract and in addition Jm~ its right of action agaimt the bond of George
B. \Vest as an automobile dealer. Should tht- Court see
fit tn quiet title i11 the plaintiff, Pelers Plumbing and
Heating Company will have its bargain upon the payment of the contract balance and ·will suffer no damage.
Salt Lake Auto Auction, Inc. ha~ it,; rights against
the dealer, GeorgE> B. \Vest, and perhaps the dealer's
hondsman, for it;; purchase money if it has not been
paid. 'l'J1ere is no evidenc-e before the Court or in the
record indicating what the exact nature of the tran~·
action between "\Ve~t and Sail Lake Auto Auction was.
As Salt Lake Auto Auction may enforce its contract,
it suffers no damag0.
The Utal-1 statute, 41-3-3, like the Wisconsin statute
and other statutes considered in the cases herinabove
cited, is not uniform in its application as between differenct contracting parties or differenct automobile sales
tran!lactions, and like such stututc~. arbitrarily forfeits
to the Vf"ndee the propr•rty of the vendor, or a bona
fide purclm~l·:· for value of the ("nntrrrd and title of the
vendor, regardless of whethf"r tlte damage of vendee
i.~ oi" $1.00 or $1,000.00 or whether the value of the
property forfeik1l to the vendee i,.; $1.00 or $5,000.00.
Tliu><, between various trUll~twtin.~ parties or various
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and different sale~ transactions there 1s no uniformity
in the amount of the forfeiture.
In the application of the statute the forfeiture is not
only gro~~ly out of pro1wdion to the possible actual
damage ]JUt is so arbitrary, oppressive and without uniformity in its applkation that it::; enforcement would be
taking of property without due process of law and contrary to the due process clause of the Con~titutiom ol'
the Lnited State::; of Ameriea and ihe State of Utah.
But for the provisions of 41-il-:l, the right::; ol' the parties
can be adju~ted at a trial and their respective damages,
if any, deterrnilJed and adju::;tcd and justice can better
be served.

POTN'l' V.
41-3-3, UTAH CODE AX.i\OTA'l'ED 1953, DIRCRIJ\-1-

I)l"ATES AGAINST AUTOMOBILE Sl<JLLJ<~RS AND
AUTm10BILE SAI.ES TRANSACTIONS CO:N'l'RARY TO 'l'HliJ (_!ONSTITCTIOX OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA AND OF 'I.'HliJ STA'rJ<~ OF'
l"l'AH.
The provisions of 41-3-3 di~criminates again~t and
applie~ only to automobile sales and persons selling
automobiles and doe~ not apply to any other sale:> transactions. Any person, firm or corporation may sell a
boat, machine, appliamJ(', jewelry, prod1wt or any chattel,
and should such a venrlor fail or refuse to furnish a bill
of sale or evidence of title at any given moment or time,
he i~ liable only under l1i::; contract of sale for the vend(:es' damages, if any there be. Even real t>~talr,, whether
of the value of $1,000.00 or $100,000.00, can be sold· and
should the vendor rail or refuse to deliver a deed or
19
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evidence of title to the property sold at a particular time,
the parties are left to their remedies under the contract.
Only an aut.oinolJile dealer or seller mu~t .forfeit his
property to the purchaser for l1is failure to furnish evidence of lit.le. Under the laws of ljtah, there is no for(()iture of a seller's property to the purchaser in any
form of sale~ transaction excepting au';omobile sales.
1'here is no ba~is or justification or reao;oTiable
reason for singling out automobile sales and sellers and
burdening them with special legislation and special forfeitures as has been done with the enactment of 41-3-3.
Auto sales transaction~ should be governed by the same
laws and rules as other mles. There is as equal an opportunity for fraud and irr'egularity in transactions involving property otliCT' than automobiles as tlwrc i~ in
automobile sales. In the ease of an automobile sale there
is no better rea~ou or basis for penalizing sellers for the
non-performance of a contract than there is for penalizing others.
Respeeifully

~ubmitted,

E. llrORGA.:-.1 \\'lXm,f
Attorney for Plaintiff & Appellant
1010 Fir~t SC'('Ill'i!Y Bank Building
Ogden, ll tah
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